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officials. Information requirements can also be
extremely important. Companies may be required
to publish audited financial reports on their
pension plan assets. With such information, for
example, workers may be less willing to accept
employment with a firm that maintains a finan-
cially weak pension plan, for fear that pension
benefits would not be available as promised. Just
as maintaining good wages and an attractive work
environment helps firms to attract high-quality
workers, so also does maintaining a strong pension
plan, provided that workers have the information
necessary to distinguish strong from weak pen-
sion plans.
The fundamental advantage of relying on
incentives is that companies are motivated by
profits and risk of loss to make sound business
decisions. Company managers have, or should
have, the information necessary to pursue effi-
cient strategies, for which they will be rewarded.
Regulatory oversight should focus on compliance
with the tax law, for example, and not substitute
the regulators’ business judgment for the judgment
of firm managers. Otherwise, two parties—man-
ager and regulator—are both making the decisions.
At best, two people are doing the work of one; at
worst, the lack of clarity about who is in charge
and who is responsible for results damages the
quality of the decisions made and the firm is sim-
ply less productive than it otherwise would be.
As an application of this principle, Federal
Reserve bank regulators do not try to substitute
B
eing in Moscow, a city whose origins
date to Neolithic times, it is easy to
appreciate how recent is the devel-
opment of pension plans. Although
pension-type funds were established in some
mining communities in Europe as early as the
Middle Ages, it was not until 1889 that the first
national public pension plan was established by
Germany. Many other countries quickly followed
in establishing their own programs, with the
United States being a relative latecomer. The
U.S. social security program was not enacted
until 1935. In fact, some U.S. companies estab-
lished private pension plans well before social
security.
My aim is to provide a broad overview of
self-regulation and compliance incentives in the
context of U.S. experience. What we mean by
self-regulation and compliance incentives is that
the government establishes financial rewards and
penalties, and requires release of information,
that encourage private firms to act in ways that
serve the interests of pension plan participants.
Serving their interests simultaneously serves the
public interest in a system that provides secure
pensions for all citizens.
As an example of an appropriate incentive,
the tax law might provide for reduced taxes on
company income if the company provides pen-
sion benefits that are available for all employees.
The tax benefits would not be available for a
company that provides pensions only for seniortheir judgment for bank management’s judgment,
but instead focus on the quality of a bank’s inter-
nal information systems and risk-management
practices. Bank examiners do look for evidence
of accounting irregularities and fraud, but more
importantly require that banks themselves main-
tain strong internal systems that make fraud dif-
ficult or impossible. Thus, regulators concentrate
on what they do best and leave bank management
to make business decisions day by day.
U.S. experience with social security, with
private plans and with the regulation of private
plans, is relevant to developing an understanding
of incentives and compliance issues in the pension
context. I believe that the economic principles
involved have broad applicability; nevertheless,
exactly how they apply to other countries will
depend on numerous matters of historical expe-
rience, characteristics of financial markets and
knowledge of participants. I hope that my obser-
vations on U.S. experience provide some insights
relevant in the Russian context.
Let me reflect for a moment on my general
approach to public policy issues such as the
design and regulation of the U.S. pension system.
I try to think about actual experience in the con-
text of economic theory to provide appropriate
analytical structure. Economists can learn from
experience the way engineers in the 19th century
learned from the collapses of railroad bridges,
which were all too frequent, or the explosion of
boilers as steamships replaced sailing ships.
Engineers understand the importance of determin-
ing the sources of accidents and routinely study
such events. Similarly, careful study of economic
problems can help make the economy safer and
the market system more efficient.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Patricia S. Pollard, research officer in the
Research Division, provided special assistance.
However, I retain full responsibility for errors.
BASIC FEATURES OF DEFINED-
BENEFIT AND DEFINED-
CONTRIBUTION PENSION
PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES
Earlier sessions in this conference have
focused on basic characteristics of pension plans
and on investment policy issues. Nevertheless,
I’ll review these topics also in the interest of an
orderly presentation of my topic.
There are two basic types of pension plans—
defined-benefit and defined-contribution. Defined-
benefit plans—whether public, like social
security, or private—promise pension benefits
based on a predetermined formula. Benefits typi-
cally are based on length of service and salary in
the final years of service. Most private defined-
benefit plans are payable as an annuity. A worker
receives a monthly retirement benefit no matter
how long he or she lives.
Defined-contribution plans make no promises
regarding future pension benefits. Rather, this
type of plan specifies the annual contribution to
a retirement savings plan; the contribution is
typically a percentage of the worker’s salary and
is often matched to some degree by an employer
contribution. The actual amount available to the
worker upon retirement depends upon the accu-
mulated contributions plus the investment return.
Examples of defined-contribution plans include
employee stock ownership plans, profit-sharing
plans, and 401(k) plans. The latter are the most
common and may incorporate aspects of the other
two plans.
Another surface distinction between private
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans
is that workers generally do not contribute a por-
tion of their salary to the former plans. Neverthe-
less, pensions are obviously valuable and the
right way to think about these promised benefits
is that they are a form of worker pay like salary,
except that payment is delayed. In contrast, with
a 401(k) plan the employee contributes out of
current salary and the employer’s contribution is
tied to the participation of the employee. Both
types of plans are heavily regulated and their
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Although the focus of my remarks is on private
pension plans, I begin with the social security
system, given that social security remains the
main source of income for most U.S. retirees.
Ninety percent of those 65 and over receive social
security benefits, and for 65 percent of these
individuals social security accounts for 50 per-
cent or more of their income. Yet, social security,
like most public pension programs, is under stress.
According to the 2003 report by the Social
Security Board of Trustees, beginning in 2018—
a mere 15 years from now—tax receipts will be
insufficient to cover benefit payments. At some
point, the United States will most likely have to
raise taxes and/or reduce benefits to maintain the
viability of the social security system.
Two main factors are responsible for the long-
term insolvency of public pension systems—
demographics and increases in the generosity of
the systems. Two ongoing demographic trends
are key. First, people are living longer. In 1940,
life expectancy in the United States was 61 years
for men and 66 years for women. Thus, a boy born
in 1940 was not even expected to be alive by the
time he was eligible to collect social security.
Those men who turned 65 in 1940 were expected
to collect Social Security for 12 years, and their
female counterparts were expected to average 13
years of benefit payments.
The change in life expectancy between 1940
and today is striking. The typical 65 year old in
the United States today is expected to collect
social security benefits for 16 years if a man and
19 years if a woman. The trend toward longer lifes-
pan is likely to continue. A child born today in
the United States is expected to live well past
retirement age. Under current social security
law, even taking into account the scheduled
increase in the normal retirement age to 67, upon
retirement this child is likely to collect benefits
for 18 years if male and 21 years if female.
The second key demographic fact is that peo-
ple are having fewer children. The baby boom
that occurred following World War II resulted in
a sharp rise in the average number of children,
peaking in the United States at 3.7. The fertility
rate currently hovers close to the replacement
level of 2.1 and is not expected to rise.
These two developments are responsible for
a decline in the number of contributors to the
social security system relative to the number of
beneficiaries. In 1955, there were almost nine
workers for each beneficiary. Today there are
slightly more than three workers for each benefi-
ciary. Experts estimate that by 2030 there will be
two contributors for every beneficiary.
These demographic trends make financing the
public pension system more difficult. This diffi-
culty is compounded by changes that increased
the generosity of benefits. The early post-war era
was a period of rapid economic growth. During
this time, the goal of most public pension systems
shifted from keeping retirees out of poverty to
allowing them to maintain their pre-retirement
standard of living. Congress increased benefits
without corresponding increases in tax rates. As
a result, by the late 1970s social security receipts
were insufficient to cover benefit payments and
a small trust fund that had accumulated was in
danger of being depleted. Faced with the revenue
shortfall and well aware of the changing demo-
graphics, the U.S. government took steps in the
1980s to increase social security revenues and to
gradually raise the retirement age from 65 to 67.
A fundamental change was the decision to
increase payroll tax rates sufficiently to accumu-
late a trust fund to fund the retirement of the
baby boom generation. Although this trust fund
will provide a cushion to the system once rev-
enues drop below benefit payments in 2018, it is
not a long-term solution. Given current contribu-
tion and benefit levels and the best estimates of
demographic trends and labor productivity, the
social security trust fund will be exhausted
before mid-century.
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social security system. The American Express
Company established the first private pension
plan in the United States in 1875. It was the rail-
roads, however, that developed the standard
model for private pension plans. In 1900, the
Pennsylvania Railroad created a noncontributory,
defined-benefit plan that provided a pension to
all workers upon reaching age 70. The pension
was based on length of service and average wage
in the last 10 years of service. Of course, only a
relatively small percentage of workers in 1900
lived to age 70.
Until relatively recently, defined-benefit
plans were the main employer-sponsored retire-
ment benefit plan. Defined-benefit plans require
no action on the part of the employee, and the
employer assumes all the investment risk. The
pension is a guaranteed amount, providing the
employer remains solvent.
In practice, however, the guarantee was
incomplete, as many employees so sadly learned
after it was too late for them to protect their retire-
ment income. Before extensive reforms in 1974,
employers were completely free to determine
when a worker’s rights to a pension were vested.
By “vesting” we mean that the employee gains
legal rights to pension assets and can upon retire-
ment receive a pension in an appropriate amount
given the employee’s salary and years of service.
In 1965, for instance, 40 percent of the workers
in pension plans were in plans that awarded vest-
ing only at the normal retirement age. An older
employee who lost his job just before normal
retirement age would be left with absolutely
nothing. Such a person was unlikely to be able
to work long enough with another firm to qualify
under that firm’s pension plan. Moreover, pension
plans were often inadequately funded and could
be terminated at the firm’s discretion without
requiring compensation to the covered workers.
A noted example arose in 1963. Studebaker
Corporation, which at the time was the oldest
major automobile producer in the United States,
closed its last domestic manufacturing plant and
terminated its pension plan. The plan was heavily
underfunded so that after covering benefits for
existing retirees, few assets remained. Nearly
4,000 workers between the ages of 40 and 59
received only 15 percent of the accumulated
value of their pensions. Younger workers received
nothing because they were yet to be vested.
One of the lessons of this experience is that
workers may not have the knowledge and infor-
mation necessary to determine whether their
company’s pension promises are likely to be kept.
In principle, fully informed workers should
demand that pension plans be properly funded
and managed so that the pension assets will be
secure even if the company suffers extreme finan-
cial reverses leading to bankruptcy. A company
pension, after all, is a form of deferred compen-
sation that a worker has as much right to expect
to receive as his or her paycheck at the end of
the month. In practice, U.S. experience suggests
that workers often do not properly monitor their
firms’ financial management to ensure the safety
of pensions.
The termination of the Studebaker pension
plan led to calls for legislative reform and over-
sight of private defined-benefit plans in the United
States. This effort culminated with the 1974 enact-
ment of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, commonly known as ERISA. ERISA and
subsequent amendments to the Act set minimum
standards for private pension plans with respect
to participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and
disclosure of financial information. ERISA limits
a firm’s ability to exclude workers from pension
coverage and established maximum work require-
ments for vesting rights. Under current rules,
full vesting must occur within 5 to 7 years of an
employee’s entrance into the plan. A company
cannot avoid paying a pension simply by firing a
worker shortly before retirement.
MAJOR ISSUES WITH PRIVATE
DEFINED-BENEFIT PLANS
Many private defined-benefit plans are expe-
riencing considerable stress today. The same
demographic facts that have created deep prob-
lems for the social security system are stressing
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panies have declining employment, both because
of the changing demographics of the U.S. labor
force and because they are in industries that are
shrinking for a variety of reasons. These compa-
nies have, or soon will have, a large number of
retired workers relative to the number of active
employees. It is difficult for these firms to earn
large enough profits to finance their pension
obligations.
A pension plan is considered adequately
funded if its assets are sufficient to meet the
present value of its liabilities. Conditions in finan-
cial markets in the past few years have resulted
in declines in the assets of many pension plans.
At the same time, declining interest rates raised
the present value of pension liabilities. The
investment policies of many pension funds were
not adequate to withstand the large stock market
decline that started in 2000.
The present value of a plan’s liabilities
depends on the age structure of participants as
well as the number of years a participant is
expected to collect benefits. Prior to 1995, pension
plans could make their own assumptions about
mortality to determine the expected duration of
benefits. Although many firms relied on standard
mortality tables, other firms assumed that the
life expectancy of their workers and retirees was
below average. Such an assumption lowered the
calculated present value of the liabilities of the
plan, which could make it appear to be fully
funded.
Allowing firms to make their own mortality
assumptions was a gigantic regulatory loophole;
I find it amazing that the loophole was not closed
until 1995. Firms are currently required to use
mortality tables prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury. The calculation of expected future
pension liabilities is a very similar problem to
that faced by life insurance companies, which
must also calculate their expected future cash
outflows based on the life expectancy of policy-
holders and the terms of life-insurance contracts.
The future stream of expected pension out-
lays can be expressed as a single present-value
amount by discounting the stream by the appro-
priate interest rate. The choice of the interest
rate can make a huge difference. Some countries
require a fixed discount rate be used, but the
United States does not. Congress had mandated
that the 30-year Treasury bond rate be used. The
government’s decision in 2001 to no longer issue
30-year bonds eliminated the usefulness of this
measure. As a temporary substitute, firms have
been allowed to use a corporate bond yield.
Although there has been much controversy
over the choice of interest rate in recent years,
the larger problem is that most pension plans
have not invested in assets of similar character
to the liabilities. The comparison with practice
by life insurance companies is instructive. Life
insurance companies have concentrated their
investments in fixed-dollar assets maturing on a
similar schedule to the expected future cash out-
lays as policyholders die. This practice of match-
ing the durations of assets and liabilities is a
standard feature of bank portfolio management
as well as of life insurance companies. Pension
funds, on the other hand, have traditionally
invested a large fraction of their assets in common
stock, even though their pension liabilities are
defined in dollar amounts that can be determined
quite accurately in actuarial terms.
In the same way that U.S. regulation of life
insurance companies developed in the late 19th
century, regulation of investment practices of
pension funds could evolve to reduce the risk
that the funds will fail. In the meantime, we rely
heavily on pension insurance through ERISA,
which established mandatory insurance for
defined-benefit plans run by private firms. The
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a
U.S. government agency, operates this program.
However, the pension insurance system has
a number of defects that require correction. With
any type of insurance arrangement, the possibility
of moral hazard arises. In the insurance context,
moral hazard is reflected in changed behavior,
such as when an owner of a car neglects to lock it
knowing that the insurance company will replace
the car should it be stolen. It appears that some
U.S. companies have permitted their pension fund
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that the pension funds are insured by the PBGC.
Although moral hazard cannot be entirely
eliminated, there are standard practices adopted
by insurers to reduce its severity. Two key meth-
ods are through the use of partial insurance and
risk-related premiums. The PBGC incorporates
the first principle through statutory limits on the
maximum pension guarantee. This feature of the
system ensures a minimum pension in the event
a plan is terminated, but retirees whose pensions
exceed the guarantee and workers whose expected
pensions exceed the guarantee have an incentive
to monitor the financial condition of the pension
plan.
Many, and perhaps most, employees do not
understand how partial the federal insurance
through PBGC is and, accordingly, their monitor-
ing is incomplete. It might be possible to make
this incentive work better, perhaps by requiring
companies to send annual statements to their
employees reporting the financial state of their
defined-benefit plans and the size of the guaran-
teed pension the employee would receive in the
event the company fails. Currently, only under-
funded plans must provide this type of informa-
tion to plan participants.
Workers and retirees, however, no matter how
well informed, are at a disadvantage in enforcing
their pension rights. Usual competitive forces
permit workers to move to other jobs if they are
dissatisfied with current pay and working condi-
tions, but that constraint is obviously ineffective
for a worker or retiree with vested pension rights.
Plan participants can seek redress through the
court system, but they may not have the financial
resources to battle companies in the courts. This
argument suggests an important role for govern-
ment in monitoring pension plans and enforcing
pension regulations.
The second method of controlling moral
hazard is the application of risk-based insurance
premiums. Unfortunately, in its early years the
PBGC did not employ risk-based premiums. Every
firm paid the same premium, initially a mere $1
per participant per year for a single-employer plan.
The premium was too low and the flat premium
structure, with premiums unrelated to risk, pro-
vided little incentive for firms to properly fund
their plans. Indeed, for the first 14 years of the
PBGC’s existence, a firm could voluntarily ter-
minate an underfunded plan. Terminations, in
combination with the low premium, led to a
series of deficits in the system. The PBGC had no
authority to raise premiums despite the deficits
but had to request congressional approval to do
so. Even with Congress twice raising the premi-
ums, in 1978 and 1986, the deficits continued.
The problem, clearly, was less with the manage-
ment of the PBGC than with the underlying law
determined by Congress.
Finally, in 1988, Congress instituted a vari-
able-rate premium that applied to underfunded
plans. But still the deficits continued. Why? Part
of the problem was that the variable-rate premium
was capped at a level that was too low to provide
a significant incentive for firms to strengthen the
most underfunded plans. That is, it was simply
cheaper for firms to pay the small extra insurance
premium than to add funds to the underfunded
plans.
According to the PBGC, the plans that paid
the maximum premium accounted for 80 percent
of the underfunding yet provided only 25 percent
of the total revenue from premiums. Subsequent
legislation, in 1994, phased out the cap on
premiums.
Currently, any firm offering a defined-benefit
pension plan pays an insurance premium of $19
per year for each plan participant. For firms whose
pension assets are less than 90 percent of the
present value of pension liabilities, an additional
premium is assessed. This premium is nine cents
for each $1,000 (or fraction thereof) of underfund-
ing. Because the extra premium is well below
the rate of interest, firms have no incentive to
borrow funds to add to weak plans; the incentive
afforded by the extra premium is for all practical
purposes worthless.
The premium penalty is combined with
mandatory contributions which in principle
could take care of the problem. Firms with plans
that are less than 90 percent funded are required
to make minimum contributions to the plan to
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years. There are, however, many exceptions to
this rule that have the effect of permitting contin-
uing underfunding for many firms. For example,
if a plan is at least 80 percent funded this year
and was more than 90 percent funded in the past
two years, the mandatory contributions do not
apply.
Legislative changes have also made it no
longer possible for a firm to voluntarily terminate
an underfunded plan. Now a plan can only be
terminated if the firm meets the financial duress
criteria established by the PBGC. Even though
financial duress criteria make it more difficult to
terminate a plan, it is still true that firms that
meet this test are able to terminate their plans,
leaving their employees with greatly reduced
pensions.
This restriction on terminations and the new
premium structure, combined with the strong U.S.
economy in the 1990s, resulted in a series of sur-
pluses for the PBGC for a few years after 1995.
Nevertheless, the fundamentals of the system
were not sound. In 2002, as a result of several
large plan terminations, the PBGC recorded the
largest deficit in its history. Concern about the
health of the PBGC is also related to the recent
sharp rise in the number of underfunded pension
plans and the extent of the underfunding. In
2002, underfunding of single-employer pension
plans reached $300 billion. This past July the
U.S. General Accounting Office designated the
PBGC as a “high risk” program in need of careful
monitoring.
The idea behind financial-duress criteria and
other exceptions that permit underfunding is
that forcing a company to fully fund its pension
plan might lead it to drop the plan or even force
the company into bankruptcy. The idea is quite
similar to “regulatory forbearance” by banking
regulators in the 1980s. The hope then was that
weak banks and savings institutions might be
able to build capital over time and recover their
strength. In practice, what happened is that many
of these financial firms took undue risks and even-
tually failed anyway. The cost to the U.S. taxpayer
of resolving failed savings institutions was in the
neighborhood of $150 billion; the amount was
much higher than it would have been had action
been taken sooner. That expensive lesson led to
new legislation and more disciplined regulatory
practices that substantially strengthened capital
in banking institutions.
The underfunding coupled with the need to
find a replacement for the Treasury bond rate
has led to calls for changes to the way liabilities
are calculated. There is a multitude of proposals.
To ensure the long-run viability of the private
defined-benefit pension system, we need to focus
on measures that will increase the level of fund-
ing for these plans rather than papering over the
problems with the hope that money will be there
when younger workers reach retirement age.
We need to provide proper incentives for firms
to fund their plans. One possibility is through
proposals that would limit the ability of under-
funded firms to increase the generosity of the
pension plans. Such a provision would be similar
to the standard provision in bond contracts that
prohibits a company from paying dividends to
shareholders if capital falls below a certain level.
Some have suggested that the solution to the
PBGC’s deficit is to raise insurance premiums.
The base-rate premium has not been increased
since 1991. Pushing up premiums, however,
increases the cost of running a defined-benefit
plan relative to a defined-contribution plan. It is
essential that premiums be risk-based. If the base
premium is too high, what appears to be an
insurance premium becomes, in effect, a tax on
financially healthy firms to support weak firms.
An excessive premium may lead a firm to termi-
nate a well-funded plan, leaving a higher propor-
tion of underfunded plans and thus raising rather
than reducing the risk of future deficits to the
PBGC. For this reason, the long-run viability of
the pension insurance system requires that insur-
ance premiums reflect actual risk as closely as
possible.
U.S. experience with bank regulation and
deposit insurance is instructive. One lesson we
have learned from banking crises is that finan-
cially weak firms have a greater incentive to
engage in risky behavior than other firms, partic-
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the firm. This understanding led to changes in
the way premiums are applied for deposit insur-
ance. Currently, premiums for deposit insurance
are based on two factors: the capital adequacy of
the bank and the risk characteristics of the bank.
There are three categories of capital adequacy:
1. well capitalized,
2. adequately capitalized, and
3. under-capitalized.
Likewise, there are three categories of risk:
1. financially sound,
2. exhibiting weakness that—if uncorrected—
would increase the probability of a loss to
the deposit insurance fund, and
3. a substantial probability of a loss to the
fund.
Banks that are well capitalized and financially
sound pay no deposit-insurance premium. As
capitalization and/or risk rises, the deposit-
insurance premium rises.
Such a system could be applied to pension
insurance. For firms that fully fund their pension
plans and follow conservative investment policies,
matching asset and liability durations, this system
would provide rewards in the form of low or no
premiums. The more underfunded the pension
plan, the less conservative the investment poli-
cies, and the weaker the financial condition of
the firm sponsoring the pension plan, the higher
would be the premiums assessed by the PBGC.
Current practice tends toward regulatory forbear-
ance for financially weak firms, whereas the
appropriate approach is to charge higher premi-
ums for such firms. Weaker firms are more likely
to terminate a plan because of financial distress.
For example, according to the PBGC, nearly 90
percent of companies whose plan terminations
resulted in large claims on the system had junk-
bond credit ratings for 10 years prior to the ter-
mination. In short, the PBGC should use the
premium structure to encourage companies to
follow sound practices
Although the PBGC is a government agency,
it receives no tax revenues. Instead, it is self-
financed, relying on premiums and asset returns
to operate. However, it is probably safer to say
that the PBGC has not yet received taxpayer sup-
port. If the PBGC could not meet its obligations,
a typical assumption is that the U.S. taxpayer
would provide support, as was the case with the
failure of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation. The burden of bailing out the PBGC
could hit at the same time as taxpayers are asked
to meet shortfalls in the Social Security system.
As a final item in my discussion of problems
with defined-benefit plans, it is important to rec-
ognize that there is a complicated interaction
between plan funding and the corporate tax law.
For example, permitting firms to deduct excessive
plan contributions before calculating corporate
income subject to tax would permit firms to
escape tax, while preventing adequate deductions
would lead to underfunding of pension plans.
This important subject of interaction of pension
regulation and the tax system goes beyond the
scope of this lecture, but must not be neglected.
HISTORICAL SKETCH AND
MAJOR ISSUES WITH DEFINED-
CONTRIBUTION PLANS
My concerns do not imply that I would sup-
port the phase-out of defined-benefit plans in
favor of defined-contribution plans. Defined-
contribution plans have become increasingly
prevalent, but there is an advantage to retaining
both types of plans because their risk character-
istics are different. With defined-benefit plans,
companies bear the investment risks. With
defined-contribution plans, all investment risks
lie with employees. A mix of the two types of plans
spreads the investment risks across all parties.
In 1978, 84 percent of workers covered by an
employer-sponsored pension were in defined-
benefit plans. In that same year the Revenue Act
added section 401(k) to the Internal Revenue Code.
This change allowed workers to contribute a
portion of their salaries, tax-free, to an employer
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plans have transformed retirement savings in the
United States. By 1998, only 14 percent of workers
with pension coverage were in defined-benefit
plans exclusively. In contrast, 56 percent were in
defined-contribution plans exclusively and 30
percent participated in both types of plans.
There are various reasons for the spread of
defined-contribution plans. For workers, these
plans generally provide greater control over
retirement savings, including a range of invest-
ment options and are more portable than defined-
benefit plans. It is relatively simple for a worker
to switch employers without losing any benefits.
For employers, defined-contribution plans provide
greater cost predictability than defined-benefit
plans and are less costly to operate.
Nonetheless, defined-contribution plans are
not without their weaknesses relative to defined-
benefit plans. With defined-contribution plans,
the individual assumes all of the investment
risk. It is possible for an individual to deplete the
funds in his or her account prior to retirement
through withdrawals or loans against the account
or gross mismanagement of the funds. Many
workers also fail to annuitize their accounts upon
retirement, leaving them open to the risk of out-
living their resources. If the government too
readily protects individuals who deplete their
retirement funds, then knowledge of the policy
creates moral hazard that probably increases the
likelihood of depletion. The cost to the taxpayers
of such a policy could also be considerable.
Some of these concerns can be overcome
through increasing the financial education of
workers. But education alone will not be suc-
cessful if the incentives are wrong. Some well-
informed individuals will simply exploit poorly
designed features of whatever plan is in place.
Overall, there is no one best form of a pension
plan. A combination of defined-benefit plans
(whether they be public or private) and defined-
contribution plans should be encouraged because
the different risk characteristics of the two types
of plans make them natural complements rather
than substitutes. However, an issue I have time
to mention but not discuss is that administrative
simplicity is an important goal. It is surely better
to have a single well-designed plan than two
poorly designed plans.
A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR GETTING THE INCENTIVES
RIGHT
Governments will be involved for many
years, and perhaps indefinitely, in regulating
private pension plans. Taxpayers are ultimately
responsible for shortfalls in retirement savings,
either through supporting guarantees of pension
plans or through financing public assistance pro-
vided to retirees who lack sufficient resources.
Regulation must ensure that minimum funding
levels are met and that prudent investment rules
are followed. That said, it is important for regula-
tion to strive to be as simple as possible, both to
reduce the cost of compliance to businesses and
to make it easy for workers and retirees to moni-
tor the behavior of the firms. And, of course,
government also has an obligation to taxpayers.
Obligations to retirees, future retirees, and tax-
payers can be met if the pension system is effi-
ciently designed. Incentives to encourage private
behavior that is in the public interest are an essen-
tial feature of efficient design.
There are several dimensions to a set of effi-
cient incentives. One important consideration,
certainly, is that we want to discourage rather
than encourage risky behavior. In the United
States, premiums for pension insurance that
inadequately reflect risk give firms with under-
funded plans an incentive to adopt riskier behav-
ior. In addition, the ability of firms to voluntarily
terminate their underfunded plans also increased
this behavior. Changes have been made to address
some of these problems but it may be time to
restructure premiums to better reflect credit risk.
Regulation should not, however, be so risk-
focused that it prevents firms and individuals
from undertaking any risk. Let me give an exam-
ple clarifying this point. The decline in the stock
market in the past few years has reduced the
assets of many individuals with 401(k) accounts.
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require all 401(k) assets to be invested in U.S.
government securities. Such a regulation would
reduce the investment risk associated with these
accounts, but it would also reduce their expected
return. Furthermore, such a policy would raise
warning signs regarding the government’s objec-
tives. Having captive holders of government bonds
makes it easier for the government to neglect its
own financial health by running large budget
deficits.
U.S. banking regulation provides some guid-
ance. Regulators insist that banks monitor and
control risk rather than eliminate it. Banks with
higher capital can take more risk because they
have a cushion to shield depositors and the
deposit insurance fund against losses.
In the United States, three legal rules govern
the activities of pension plan administrators, who
have the legal status of fiduciaries. A fiduciary
has the responsibility of acting in the interest of
beneficiaries, and not its own interest. The three
rules are the exclusive purpose rule, the prudent
man rule, and the diversification rule. The first
obligates fiduciaries to act in the best interests of
the plan’s participants and beneficiaries—not
the best interests of the firm sponsoring the plan.
The second rule requires the fiduciary to act with
the same care, skill, prudence, and diligence that
a prudent person would take. The third rule
requires the fiduciary to diversify the plan’s
investments by type, geographic area, maturity,
and industrial classification to minimize the risk
of losses.
Neither the prudent man rule nor the diver-
sification rule set quantitative limitations on
portfolio holdings. Indeed, the only quantitative
restriction on defined-benefit plans in the United
States is that they cannot invest more than 10
percent of the plan’s assets in the firm’s own secu-
rities and real property. This limitation reduces
the risk that a sharp drop in the plan’s assets will
occur if the firm encounters financial difficulties.
Experience in recent years, with the sharp
drop in the stock market, suggests that the pru-
dent man rule might need to be interpreted to
require that underfunded plans more closely
match asset and liability durations and that asset
characteristics should be more closely aligned
with the fixed-dollar nature of pension liabilities.
Overfunded plans should have more investment
freedom, as they do not create a risk to pension
beneficiaries or taxpayers.
The diversification rule does not apply to
401(k) plans. Although most 401(k) plans allow
the participant some flexibility in determining
the allocation of his or her investments, firms
and employees are free to ignore principles of
sound portfolio management, such as adequate
diversification. A firm may determine the alloca-
tion of both its own contributions and employees’
contributions to a 401(k) plan. One such firm that
followed this approach was Color Tile. Around
80 percent of the funds in Color Tile’s 401(k) plan
were invested in its own assets. In 1996 the firm
filed for bankruptcy and the value of its stock
plummeted resulting in large losses to the plan’s
participants.
The Color Tile bankruptcy prompted the pas-
sage of legislation to apply a 10 percent limit on
company stock holdings in the assets of 401(k)
plans. The limit, however, only applies to the
participant’s contributions to plans where the
firm determines the portfolio composition of the
plan’s assets. Under current law, employers may
control the allocation of the firm’s contributions
to 401(k) plans and may restrict a participant’s
ability to reallocate these contributions. That is,
a firm may make its contribution to an
employee’s 401(k) plan in its own stock.
The stock market decline and particularly the
collapse of the stock values of a few notable com-
panies have led to some to call for an application
of the 10 percent restriction on the employer’s
contribution to a 401(k) plan. There is no easy
answer. The benefits of diversification are well
established and, as such, support restrictions on
mandated holdings of a firm’s stock. Indeed it may
make sense for a worker to hold a portfolio of
assets whose risk characteristics are negatively
correlated with the risk to employment. That is,
an employee would not want to lose his income
as a result of the poor performance of his firm
and have the value of his assets fall at the same
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hold company stock gives them a long-term stake
in the company and thus the incentive to make
sure the company is profitable.
These are not simple issues, but my instinct
is that the long-run confidence in the U.S. pension
system would be improved by restricting to some
degree the fraction of the firm’s contributions
that can be in its own stock. The rationale for such
a restriction is that the interests of plan partici-
pants—especially retirees—and the sponsoring
firm are not the same. Perhaps a 50 percent cap
on company stock would still retain a significant
incentive encouraging worker productivity while
providing significant diversification protecting
pension benefits. Particularly in the context of a
new pension system, it would probably make
sense to maintain a relatively low cap on com-
pany stock until the system becomes established
and people become confident in its soundness.
A key aspect of regulation is establishing
sound accounting standards. Increasing the dis-
closure and transparency of financial information
regarding pension plans is essential if participants
are to monitor the financial health of these plans.
Here again there is room for improvement in the
U.S. system. According to the executive director
of the PBGC, participants in terminated plans
are often surprised to learn that their plan was
underfunded.
It is also important to recognize how regula-
tions may give preferences to one type of retire-
ment savings plan over another. In the United
States, the shift from defined-benefit plans to
defined-contribution plans was supported by
regulatory changes. Employee contributions to a
401(k) plan are tax-free, but employee contribu-
tions to a defined-benefit plan must come from
after-tax income. More importantly, the costs of
operating defined-benefit plans are higher than
defined-contribution plans. Because of economies
of scale in the operation of defined-benefit plans,
the cost-disadvantage of defined-benefit plans is
particularly marked for small employers. One
study has estimated the cost of a defined-benefit
plan as averaging $850 per participant per year
for a small firm with 15 participants, whereas the
cost per participant declines to $56 for a large firm
with 10,000 participants.1 Congress has made
efforts to create defined-contribution plans that
can be easily set-up by small businesses, such as
Simplified Employee Pension Plans (SEPs), but
no such effort has been made to encourage
defined-benefit plans.
An often-overlooked area is the need for
financial education. If we are to encourage work-
ers to assume more responsibility for their retire-
ment savings, we need to make sure they have
the proper tools to monitor the activities of their
firm’s defined-benefit plans or make decisions
regarding portfolio allocations in their defined-
contribution plans. The Federal Reserve System
has taken a lead in this effort, creating a web site
and materials devoted to personal financial
education.
Another area where the Federal Reserve has
a role to play is in maintaining overall financial
stability. It should be clear that there is a link
between the health of the financial system and
the health of the pension system. Despite recent
problems in equity markets, the U.S. financial
system remains healthy. The banking system in
particular is in strong financial condition. That
strength has been important in limiting the extent
of the recession of 2001 and helping to sustain
the economy in the face of the large decline in
the equity markets.
A private pension system will clearly work
better in an economy with well-developed finan-
cial markets. A good capital market is important
in providing a range of assets to meet the needs
of those saving for retirement and those drawing
upon these savings. One area where even in the
United States financial markets are lacking is in
the ready availability of annuities. With the
increasing reliance upon defined-contribution
plans, the availability of low-cost annuities and
an understanding of their role are increasingly
important.
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1 Olivia S. Mitchell, “International Models for Pension Reform,” Pension Research Council Working Paper 98-5, 1998.Although it is much easier to introduce a
pension plan in an economy with well-developed
capital markets, it is also true that the pension
system can be an important source of saving for
a growing economy. The need of pension man-
agers to find good investments will strengthen
the capital market.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The United States, as I hope I have explained,
does not have a perfect pension system. Indeed,
the system suffers today from a number of serious
strains and poor design features. Nevertheless,
there are ways to address these strains and to
strengthen the system over time. Without question,
the central feature of a program to strengthen the
system is to focus on policy changes that create
better incentives for the private sector to act in
the public interest.
There are three core principles in the design
of better incentives for the pension system. One
is to focus above all on the interests of plan par-
ticipants, understanding that pension rights
reflect compensation firms pay to employees on
a deferred basis. Deferred compensation belongs
to plan participants and not to firms. Second,
financial incentives should be aligned as closely
as possible to actual costs and risks, as with risk-
based insurance premiums. Third, information
on plans should be complete and readily available.
All plan characteristics and regulations should
be reviewed regularly to be sure that no unin-
tended consequences are undermining the pen-
sion system.
To return to one of my opening comments,
we are fortunate that the engineers whose
bridges fell down did not give up building rail-
roads. Developing sound practices and institu-
tions takes time; progress requires a willingness
to study the sources of problems and to address
them. The task is ongoing and never finished.
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